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Abstract
Some decision situations are so objectionable or repugnant that people refuse to make a choice. This paper seeks to
better understand taboo responses, and to distinguish choices that are truly taboo from those that are merely difficult
or confusing. Using 22 scenarios that describe potentially taboo issues, Experiment 1 explores reasons for disapproval
of the scenarios. We measure a large number of possible reasons for disapproval and a variety of preference responses
(including willingness to accept), in order to test for subtleties in taboo responses. We also test cognitive and affective
responses to the scenarios. Experiment 2 further explores the interaction, found in Experiment 1, between affective and
cognitive factors. Taken as a whole, our results show that people are able to indicate their disapproval consistently across
a variety of preference elicitation methods, that their disapproval is better understood as an attitude measure than as an
economic valuation (even when the measure is in monetary terms), and that taboo responses are driven primarily by
affect.
Keywords: taboo, decisions, tradeoffs, values, risks, affect, cognition, refusals, willingness to accept (WTA).
1 Introduction
Decision making is characterized by the need to learn
about and balance the pros and cons of various options
and then, with use of this information, make a choice.
This process typically involves making tradeoffs across
multiple dimensions of value and subjectively weighing
the anticipated gains and losses. Most people make it
through their day’s normal decisions without a crippling
degree of effort: we spend money for groceries, we de-
cide on commuting routes and vacation options, we vote
for preferred candidates in elections, and so on, without
much stress.
Choices that require picking the best option among
several unattractive possibilities, however, typically in-
duce a sizable degree of decision anxiety (Luce, Bettman,
& Payne, 1997). For instance, many people find it worri-
some to be faced with a choice among alternative cancer
treatments, a vote on whether nuclear wastes should be
stored above or below ground, or a decision about euth-
anizing stray cats. Not only do these decisions include
unfamiliar tradeoffs, but they may involve moral and eth-
ical concerns that people often are reluctant to think about
or consider taboo to balance against other issues (Hoga-
rth, 1987). In some situations, the reluctance associated
with weighing the pros and cons associated with an objec-
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tionable decision context leads to such a strong negative
reaction that the individual may refuse to make a choice.
There are several ways in which a person may indicate
that a choice is objectionable. One is simply to refuse
to make it. Another is to make a decision but to do so
only after indicating extreme reluctance. In the context
of public choice surveys, for example, this reluctance of-
ten takes the form of a protest response to a question
(Mitchell & Carson, 1989), such as indicating a willing-
ness to pay millions of dollars for a beneficial action or
indicating that all the money in the world would not pro-
vide acceptable compensation for a loss. Of course, there
may be situations in which the risks or costs are so large
(e.g., a substantial decline in the health of one’s children)
that most people would never seriously consider the pro-
posed tradeoff no matter how large are the benefits, but
this stance is especially notable when respondents con-
tinue to refuse to make the choice even when the disad-
vantage or risk or cost is reduced to a very small level
(see Baron, 2001). In still other cases, an individual who
feels that a choice is objectionable might respond but not
use the desired metric; a response requested using dol-
lars or a rating scale might instead be provided in terms
of an essay or a picture or a single word. For instance,
in surveys asking for dollar willingness to accept com-
pensation for environmental changes, some respondents
have written long diatribes in the margins of the survey,
admonishing the experimenters for their insensitivity (Ir-
win, 1994, Irwin & Baron, 2001).
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Refusals to make a choice due to the objectionable na-
ture of the required value tradeoff have captured the at-
tention of researchers and writers from many fields, in-
cluding economics, policy analysis, anthropology, the de-
cision sciences, and political science as well as psychol-
ogy (Gregory, 2002). Yet there has been little research
on the important related question of separating what is
truly taboo from what is instead a choice that we protest
because it is difficult or confusing or it makes us angry.
From the individual’s perspective, however, it is impor-
tant that others understand whether one’s apparent refusal
to make a choice reflects a deeply held belief or ethical
standard, with the refusal therefore to be respected be-
cause it is in keeping with the person’s underlying val-
ues, or whether it instead reflects difficulty or confusion,
in which case help may be desired to facilitate engage-
ment in a consequential personal or social decision. A
similar distinction exists from society’s perspective, in
terms of whether those refusing to answer questions are
simply exercising their rights or, alternatively, whether
a poorly phrased or unnecessarily complicated or diffi-
cult description or question instead has the (unintended)
result of denying access to individuals who would other-
wise want to provide input to a difficult personal choice
or a controversial policy debate.
Several previous research efforts have laid a sound
foundation for research on these issues. Philip Tetlock
and his colleagues, for example, have identified a num-
ber of taboo tradeoffs and value conflicts, referred to as
transactions that transgress the spheres of justice (Tet-
lock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997).
Tetlock’s research has focused on the conditions under
which people are likely to treat tradeoffs as taboo, typ-
ically as the result of a request to express something of
value (such as the concept of freedom) in terms of a fun-
damentally unfamiliar metric (such as dollars), yielding
what he terms a disparate relationship model. A sec-
ond research effort, focusing on the concept of protected
values, is most closely linked to Jonathan Baron and his
colleagues (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Baron & Leshner,
2000; Irwin & Baron 2001). Protected values are char-
acterized as those that resist tradeoffs with other values,
particularly economic values, resulting in rules for de-
cision making that apply irrespective of predicted con-
sequences (e.g., “do not eat foods containing modified
genes” regardless of what the food is, its relative cost, or
which genes were modified). Although Baron’s experi-
ments show that individuals may recognize the existence
of multiple dimensions, the concept of protected values
asserts that in some cases they may feel that one ele-
ment is infinitely more important than others (Baron &
Spranca, 1997). Baron’s research suggests that protected
values often are characterized by three related properties:
quantity insensitivity (one abortion is as bad as 100 abor-
tions), agent relativity (it matters who makes the trade-
off), and moral obligation (denoting a social, as well as
personal, reference).
Many choices involve both cognitive and emotional or
affective1 dimensions of value, including the typically de-
sirable choices faced by consumers (e.g., selecting one of
two snacks; see Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999) as well as more
objectionable choices such as those involved in difficult
decisions (e.g., selecting non-commodities such as pain;
see Beattie & Barlas, 2001). Luce, Payne, and Bettman
(2001) have argued that, when decision environments are
both consequential and potentially threatening, individ-
uals not only need to trade off the accuracy of decision
strategies against the required effort (Payne, Bettman, &
Johnson, 1993) but also need to add in the third objective
of coping with negative emotions. In such cases, cog-
nitive activity may have the effect of focusing the deci-
sion maker on the facts of the problem instead of on the
associated emotion; the (typically unstated) assumption
that this is both possible and beneficial lies at the heart
of many problem-solving approaches such as cost-benefit
analysis, negotiation analysis, and analytically-based per-
sonal therapy techniques. The presumption is that think-
ing may calm the respondents enough that they are able
to deal with the negative emotion and form a coherent
response. Yet the negative response itself also may carry
important information about how individuals perceive the
choice and why they would refuse to provide an answer
(or, at least, what is considered to be an acceptable an-
swer).
Although it has been recognized for some time that
there is a link between deliberative and affective capabili-
ties (e.g., Wilson et al., 1989), the interaction has received
only limited examination in the context of response re-
fusals. In this paper we seek to identify the cognitive and
emotional reasons that could help to identify why some
choices are seen as taboo and others are characterized by
mere protest or disapproval. We also seek to study the
reasons people give for rejecting a choice in light of the
interaction between cognition and affect. Our interest in
this paper is not directly to provide advice to decision
makers (although we think our findings are relevant) but
rather to understand more fully an individual’s reasons for
being reluctant to make a difficult choice and, in turn, to
learn more about how to separate those choices for which
people can be helped to make more informed tradeoffs
from those that are truly taboo.
1We use the term affect as referring to people’s positive and negative
feelings toward an external stimulus, such as an activity or a proposed
plan of action. These feelings persist over time as enduring emotional
dispositions and, in contrast to mood shifts, are a relatively stable aspect
of one’s psychological response (Peters & Slovic, 2000). Cognitive or
deliberative capabilities, in contrast, are related to the individual’s abil-
ity to perceive information, hold it in memory, and process it.
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2 Experiment 1
The goals for Experiment 1 were: (1) to explore whether
mere disapproval can be distinguished from protest and
from taboo, (2) to study the reasons for disapproval, and
(3) to study the relationship between reasons and disap-
proval.
Experiment 1 was based on questionnaires that de-
scribed 22 brief scenarios, covering a wide range of po-
tentially taboo issues, including environmental protec-
tion, safety, human and animal rights, and human cell
cloning. Four of the 22 scenarios were designed to
be neutral (non-taboo); these were included as controls,
to test the participants’ ability to make discriminations
among their evaluations. Approval or disapproval was
measured by six different scales, including overall ac-
ceptability and dollar-based scales. Sixteen reasons for
disapproval were presented for each scenario.
2.1 Participants
The participants were recruited through an advertisement
in the University of Oregon student newspaper. Trained
experimenters waited in a room on campus during the
hours specified in the ad; participants could come in at
a time of their own choosing. Participants received an in-
formation letter and a packet, the first task of which was
this experiment. The packet also included a demograph-
ics sheet and several unrelated tasks. Each participant
was paid $10 upon leaving.
Of the 254 participants who completed this experi-
ment, six were excluded because they gave notably incon-
sistent answers at least five times (out of 11) to two items
which both asked for overall evaluations of the same sce-
nario. Notably inconsistent means that they were on the
extreme opposing ends of the scale for the two (func-
tionally equivalent) questions. The remaining 248 par-
ticipants were 126 males and 121 females, plus one who
did not fill out the demographics sheet. Their ages ranged
from 18 to 64; the median age was 20.
2.2 Design
2.2.1 Scenarios
The stimuli were 22 mini-scenarios, each in two short
paragraphs. The first paragraph of each scenario was
written in bold type at the start of a page, followed by
the acceptability and reasons scales (described later). In
each case, this first paragraph explained a proposal, plan,
or decision that might be viewed as controversial in that
it entailed some costs but also would result in some bene-
fits. For example, one scenario began with this paragraph:
The government is considering a plan to per-
mit logging of old-growth trees on one portion
of a National Park in order to harvest micro-
scopic organisms that grow in their roots, be-
cause these organisms might lead to new phar-
maceutical products that would help to fight
MS (multiple sclerosis).
The second paragraph followed the first 11 of the ac-
ceptability/reasons scales and described in more detail
how the decision would benefit the participant (unless this
was specified in the first paragraph) and also asked for an
evaluation of the scenario in terms of a willingness-to-
accept (WTA) question. For the old-growth trees ques-
tion, this second paragraph was:
The plan will require that the logging company
pay the Park Service for the timber it logs. If
new drugs are successfully developed using the
root organisms, then additional payments will
be made to the Park Service by the pharma-
ceutical firms. These payments would lower
your taxes. In addition, successful treatment of
MS would lower your medical insurance costs.
What is the SMALLEST savings in taxes and
insurance costs each year that you would re-
quire to approve of this plan?
Table 1 shows a summary of these 22 stimuli. (The
scenario shown here is called MSLog.) The Appendix
provides the full two-paragraph stimuli, starting with a
brief label and ending with a code indicating in which
packet, and in which order, the scenario appeared and a
dollar amount, which will be explained later. (The label,
code, and dollar amount were not presented to the partic-
ipants.)
Eighteen of the scenarios described potentially taboo
actions, such as a utility company wanting to reduce ex-
penditures on pollution controls, a hospital wanting to
harvest organs from patients in a deep coma, and an au-
tomobile company deciding not to fix a defect in their
cars in order to keep prices low. The other four scenarios
(these all start with “N” in Table 1) paralleled four of the
bad scenarios but with the taboo aspect removed. For ex-
ample, an insurance company proposal to charge higher
rates to blacks than to whites was changed to charging
higher rates to smokers than to non-smokers.
Each participant received 11 scenarios, one per page.
Two neutral scenarios always appeared as the second and
fifth pages, and no participant received both a neutral sce-
nario and its bad counterpart. The scenarios were pre-
sented in one of two random orders.
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Table 1: Summaries of scenarios used in Experiment 1
BanDrugs Pharmaceutical company proposes to increase its profits by selling less-developed nations drugs that
are banned in all industrialized countries.
CarCost Automobile company decides not to recall 1999-model cars because costs of repairs are predicted to
be high in relation to number of lives saved.
CarSuits Automobile company decides not to recall 1999-model cars because costs of predicted lawsuits due
to injuries and deaths are lower than recall costs.
CloneCell Genetics company plans to clone human cells to aid serious burn patients.
*NCloneCell Genetics company plans to grow artificial skin in Petri dish to aid serious burn patients.
Coma Local hospital plans to harvest organs for transplants from patients in deep coma.
Dolphins Commercial fishers propose technique to create employment and reduce fish prices but would in-
crease dolphin deaths by about 35%.
DrugTest Hospital decides not to halt a study of a new cancer drug and to continue giving half its patients a
placebo although early results show the new drug saves lives.
*NDrugTest Hospital proposes giving half its patients a promising new cancer drug and the other half a different
promising cancer drug.
GenMod World-wide conglomerate to sell genetically modified wheat with added vitamins to African coun-
tries.
GenRsch Food conglomerate makes proposal to National Science Foundation to do research on genetic modi-
fication of wheat, leading to more drought-resistant strains.
Highway State Dept. of Transportation decides not to improve dangerous highway for cost reasons.
*NHighway State Dept. of Transportation decides not to improve dangerous highway because there have been no
serious accidents.
LifeIns Insurance company sets different life insurance rates for whites and blacks.
*NLifeIns Insurance company sets different life insurance rates for smokers and non-smokers.
Military Congress considers plan to allow military personnel or their families to buy their way out of foreign
military service.
MSLog Government considers logging old-growth forest to harvest microscopic organisms that might help
lead to new drugs for treating MS (multiple sclerosis).
Pollute Local utility company seeks permission to save ratepayers money but would increase pollution and
deaths from childhood asthma.
Puppies State legislature considers whether unwanted puppies and kittens should be sold to experimental labs.
RadioNuc Congress proposes law to permit higher rates of radionuclide emissions from coal-fired power plants
to lower electricity costs and reduce brownouts.
TreeTrade Timber company proposes giving up large second-growth forested area near urban center in return
for rights to harvest remote tract of virgin forest.
UnivMonk University plans to breed monkeys for use in HIV/AIDS research despite lack of appropriate labora-
tory space.
Note. Scenarios shown here are one-sentence summaries of the full two-paragraph scenarios actually seen by partici-
pants, shown in the Appendix. The four neutral items immediately follow their non-neutral versions and are denoted
by asterisks. The names of the scenarios were not shown to participants and are included here to facilitate discussion
in the text.
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2.2.2 Kinds of disapproval
Fourteen statements or questions about the scenario ap-
peared on the same page as the scenario. Six of these, two
presented to participants at the beginning (see Table 2,
#1 and #2) and four at the end (#11–#14), concerned the
overall acceptability of the scenario: Do individuals agree
with what is proposed? What are their feelings about it?
Is it right to think about an exchange of this type in terms
of dollar values? Except for items #11 and #12, the par-
ticipant was asked in each case to circle a number from 1
(Disagree) to 5 (Agree).
The disapproval statements (as shown in Table 2) were
the same for all scenarios and all packets, except that the
wording of item #12, the WTA item, differed for each
scenario in order to make the question make sense. The
exact wording is shown in the Appendix as the second
paragraph for each item. The response scale for item #11
(“All in all, my feelings about this proposal are . . . ”),
shown in Table 2, instructed the participant to continue
to the last three items (which ask about dollar-based val-
uations) only if their response was negative or undecided
(i.e., “1”, “2” or “3” on the five-point “highly negative”
to “highly positive” scale).
2.2.3 Reasons
The middle items on each page were eight (of 16) state-
ments designed to elicit the reasons that participants
might find it difficult, or be unwilling, to approve of the
scenario. Quite simply, these 16 were all the reasons we
could think of to explain why a person might reject a sce-
nario. The reasons are shown in Table 3. The 16 reasons
were divided into two sets (I and II) such that each set
contained at least one affective reason (e.g., “This pro-
posal disgusts or repulses me.”) and at least one cogni-
tive reason (e.g., “I think this proposal is complex, with
many aspects to consider, so it’s hard to evaluate.”).2
Each reason set appeared in two orders; one order had
the cognitive reasons first and the affective reasons last,
whereas the other order started with the affective reasons
and ended with the cognitive reasons.
2.2.4 Instructions
The factorial combination of two sets of scenarios by two
orders of scenarios by two sets of reasons by two orders
of reasons produced 16 different versions. Each partici-
pant received one version of eleven pages plus an instruc-
tional cover page. The instructions said:
2Tables 2 and 3 show the word “proposal” in several items. This
word was changed as appropriate to “plan” or “decision” to match the
wording of the scenario.
In this task we are asking you for your opinions
about eleven different plans, decisions, or pro-
posals, each typed at the top of a page. There
are no right or wrong answers; we are inter-
ested in your opinions. Please take your time,
reading carefully and giving us your thoughtful
opinions.
Some of these plans may seem somewhat
yucky. Please don’t let your feeling for one
of them affect your feelings for the next one.
“Wipe the slate clean” as you turn each page.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Order effects
The effects of scenario order, reasons order, and their in-
teraction were tested for each scenario and for each scale
(except the WTA scale). In all, 1,716 tests were con-
ducted, of which 8.3% were significant at the .05 level,
but of course these tests were not independent of each
other. None of the order effects was theoretically instruc-
tive.
2.3.2 Kinds of disapproval
General acceptability: Three scales, #1, #2, and #11
(see Table 2), reflected the overall acceptability of each
scenario and were answered by all participants. There
was a large range of means for these items across sce-
narios (#1: 1.52 for CarCost to 4.32 for NCloneCell; #2:
1.67 for NCloneCell to 3.98 for CarCost; #11: 1.64 for
CarCost to 4.04 for NCloneCell, all on a scale from 1
to 5); note that the best and worst scenarios were the
same for all three acceptability measures. Thus, there was
discrimination across the scenarios and strong agreement
among the participants as to which scenarios were good
and bad.
Further, we expected that the items constructed to be
taboo would be rated as less acceptable than the neutral
items. This was also the case: The average acceptability
(as measured by the mean of scale 1, scale 11, and the re-
verse of scale 2) of the neutral scenarios was 3.95 versus
2.54 for the taboo scenarios, t = 25.8, p < .0001, for both
sets of scenarios combined.
Appropriateness of valuing monetarily: The two fi-
nal scales (#13 and #14) concerned the appropriateness
of getting paid to accept these scenarios. Both used 5-
point scales to determine participants’ agreement with the
statements “I don’t think it’s right to put a dollar value
on something like this” (#13) and “You couldn’t pay me
enough to approve of this proposal” (#14). The range of
means across scenarios was 2.69 for NHighway to 4.47
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Table 2: Acceptability Items
Agree Disagree
1. I agree with this proposal (circle one number) 1 2 3 4 5
2. I would not approve of this proposal no matter how high the benefits 1 2 3 4 5
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
11. All in all, my feelings about this proposal are:
Highly Negative Undecided Highly Positive
1 2 3 4 5︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
If you circled “1,” “2,” or “3,” continue to fill out the rest of
this page before going on to the next page.
If you circled “4” or “5,” go directly
to the next page.
12. What is the SMALLEST reduction in your yearly cost for electricity that you would require to approve of
this proposal to reduce expenditures on pollution controls?
My saving would have to be at least $_________ per year to approve of this proposal.
13. I don’t think it’s right to put a dollar value on something like this. 1 2 3 4 5
14. You couldn’t pay me enough to approve of this proposal. 1 2 3 4 5
Note. The wording in item #12 is for the Pollute scenario. The lead of this item was different for every scenario; see
the Appendix.
for Military (for #13), and 2.21 for NlifeInsur to 4.18
for LifeInsur (for #14). The mean of 4.47 on Military
for scale #13 indicates virtual unanimity among the dis-
approving or undecided participants, agreeing that they
“don’t think it’s right to put a dollar value” on the item
under consideration.
Willingness to accept: Scale #12 was the fill-in-the-
blank WTA question. The instructions made clear that
this scale (and scales #13 and #14) should not be an-
swered if participants were positive or highly positive in
their feelings about the scenario (see Table 2). Across all
data, 31% of all responses fell in this category. (For this
and all other analyses, when participants filled in the last
3 items contrary to instructions, their responses were dis-
carded.) An additional 23% of the responses were blank
(even though item #11 was scored lower than 4, indicat-
ing negative or undecided feelings), 7% were “0,” and
39% were a positive dollar amount.
2.3.3 Additional participant responses
The participants were not asked to write comments and
there was not much space to do so. Nevertheless, some
participants did write comments. Almost all of the com-
ments were about WTA and most of them indicated a re-
fusal to answer the question (e.g., to CarSuits one par-
ticipant answered “0” and then wrote “I would not buy
car A”; another participant left a blank for WTA for Dol-
phins and wrote, “You could not pay me to increase dol-
phin deaths”). In addition, one of the experimenters asked
several participants, after they had completed and turned
in their questionnaires, why they didn’t fill in item #12.
Almost always, they replied to the effect that no amount
of money was appropriate. Other participants wrote in
ridiculously high amounts of money, up to ten billion dol-
lars, in response to the WTA question.
2.3.4 Construction of the Protest measure
We constructed a Protest measure for WTA to include
all the responses that seemed to be refusals to give a
WTA amount. This measure included all of the “0” re-
sponses (because it makes no sense to say, for example,
that you have negative feelings about the CarSuits sce-
nario yet you are willing to buy Car A for the same cost
as Car B), some of the blanks (depending on the context
for these responses), and dollar responses that were un-
realistically high. Interpretation of the upper limit for an
acceptable dollar amount of compensation (above which
the response is coded as a Protest) necessarily reflected
judgments of the experimenters, because these amounts
differed across scenarios. For example, it is at least re-
motely possible that you could save $12,500 on the cost
of a $25,000 car but absurd to suppose that your home
electrical bill could be cut by $12,500 per year. The par-
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Table 3: Reasons statements.
Set I:
3/10 Complex: I think this proposal is complex, with many aspects to consider, so it’s hard to evaluate.
4/9 Phony: Asking me to approve or reject this proposal is a phony choice; there is a better way to deal
with this situation.
5/6 Not Me: I don’t feel competent to judge this proposal; somebody else should.
6/8 Future: I worry that there will be bad consequences from this proposal in the future (1, 5, or 50 years
from now).
7/7 Not Trust: I don’t trust the managers of this situation.
8/4 Moral: The proposal is morally or ethically wrong.
9/5 Norms: This proposal violates the norms of our society/culture.
10/3 Disgust: This proposal disgusts or repulses me.
Set II:
3/10 Conflict: It is hard to evaluate this proposal because its good and bad elements are in conflict.
4/9 Not Enuf Info: You haven’t given me enough information to make a careful evaluation of this pro-
posal.
6/8 Slippery: This is a slippery slope. Accepting this now will encourage new, worse proposals in the
future. We’ve got to draw the line here.
7/7 Send Message: An important reason for reversing this proposal is to send a message to the people
who proposed it.
5/6 Not Party To: It might be okay for this to happen elsewhere but I don’t want to be a party to it by
agreeing it.
9/5 Uncomfort: It makes me uncomfortable to think about this topic.
8/4 Religious: I have religious objections to this proposal.
10/3 Anger: This proposal makes me angry.
Note. The names of the reasons were not given to the participants; they are included to facilitate discussion in the
text. The numbering shows the two orders in which the reasons were presented. The word “proposal” was changed
to “plan” or “decision” as appropriate. All appeared with a 5-point rating scale (1 = Disagree; 5 = Agree).
enthetical dollar amounts shown at the end of each sce-
nario in the Appendix give the upper limits for WTA an-
swers; above these limits the response was considered a
Protest. In all cases, these limits were intentionally set
quite high, ranging from $450 (Coma) to $12,500 (Car-
Cost and CarSuits).
Leaving the WTA item blank is an ambiguous re-
sponse; it might indicate that the participant couldn’t fig-
ure out what number to give (e.g., for BanDrugs, one par-
ticipant left it blank and wrote “Need to know more about
the likelihood of litigation arising from this proposal”) or
it might be a refusal to answer (e.g., for Dolphins one
participant left WTA blank and wrote “I would never ap-
prove of this proposal”). The responses to scales #13
(“not right to put dollar values on this”) and #14 (“you
couldn’t pay me enough to approve”) can clarify this am-
biguity; agreement with either of them shows a rejection
of the WTA question.
Accordingly, the coding rules for construction of the
Protest measure were:
0 if the response to item #11 was positive (4 or
5).
1 if the WTA was greater than zero and equal to
or smaller than the upper limit shown in the Ap-
pendix, or if WTA was blank and both items
#13 and #14 were 3 or less.
2 if WTA was greater than the upper limit
shown in the Appendix, or if WTA was equal
to zero , or if WTA was blank and either #13
or #14 was greater than 3.
Table 4 shows the frequencies and percents for all re-
sponses to the WTA item, for neutral and non-neutral sce-
narios separately.
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Table 4: Frequencies and percentages for WTA responses, Experiment 1.
Neutral Scenarios Non-neutral scenarios
Totals Subtotals Totals Subtotals
f % f % f % f %
Item #11 > 3 332 67 513 23
Blank 38 8 584 26
Blank protest 24* 5 510* 23
Blank non-protest 14 3 74 3
Zero 18* 4 169* 8
Positive WTA 108 22 966 43
WTA w/in range 92 19 621 28
WTA too high 16* 3 345* 15
Total 496 2232
* Protest = 2 58 12 1024 46
Our primary dependent measure: Disapproval.
With the five acceptability scales (#1, #2, #11, #13, and
#14) and the Protest measure from WTA, we had six mea-
sures of the overall acceptability (or approval) of each
scenario. These six measures were highly intercorrelated.
Using the mean across participants for each scenario, the
absolute values of the intercorrelations across scenarios
for the six measures ranged from .86 to .99, with a me-
dian of .95. With such high correlations, it seemed appro-
priate to combine these measures into one Disapproval
measure, the simple sum of the other six measures, added
or subtracted as appropriate:
Disapproval = −#1 +#2−#11 +#13 +
#14 + Protest+ 9.
We added a constant 9 to the Disapproval measure to
avoid a meaningless zero point. In calculating the Disap-
proval measure, if items #13 or #14 were blank because
the response to item #11 was positive (4 or 5), the par-
ticipant was given a value of 0 on those items. Thus,
the Disapproval measure has a potential range of 0 (most
approving) to +24 (most disapproving). As shown in Ta-
ble 5, the actual range of mean Disapproval scores across
scenarios is 3.85 to 18.51, with a mean of 12.80 and me-
dian of 14.48. Only one of the scenarios (which involved
cloning human cells to aid burn patients) was rated as ac-
ceptable by participants; 9 of the 18 taboo scenarios were
rated as 16 (rounded) or higher, in the upper one-third of
the range for the Disapproval measure. Standard devia-
tions, not shown, ranged from 5.4 to 8.5. The n’s ranged
from 114 to 124.
Table 5: Disapproval scores for the 22 scenarios in Ex-
periment I.
Scenario Disapproval Scenario Disapproval
CarCost 18.51 UnivMonk 14.46
LifeIns 18.41 TreeTrade 13.18
Pollute 18.21 MSLog 11.20
BanDrugs 17.99 DrugTest 10.82
Military 17.94 GenRsch 9.26
CarSuits 17.76 GenMod 8.73
Dolphins 17.18 NDrugTest 8.17
Puppies 15.98 CloneCell 5.66
RadioNuc 15.68 NLifeIns 4.44
Coma 15.06 NHighway 4.30
Highway 14.52 NCloneCell 3.85
Mean 12.80
Table 5 also shows that the four scenarios rewrit-
ten to be neutral (NCloneCell, NHighway, NLifeInsur,
and NDrugTest) did have the lowest Disapproval scores,
along with the CloneCell scenario.
Analysis of large WTA: As previously noted, many
participants gave very large WTA responses. Does a re-
sponse of, say, one million dollars indicate greater dis-
approval than an equally absurd response of $100,000?
Table 6 shows that the answer to this question is, surpris-
ingly, yes. For this analysis large WTA responses were
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Table 6: Mini-disapproval and rated WTA for large dollar-based WTA.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mini-disapprovala Rated WTAb
$WTA n Mean Median n Mean Median
$1,000 126 –1.12 –2 163 4.63 4
$1,001–4,999 98 –0.84 –1 115 4.50 4
$5,000–9,999 99 –0.11 0 94 3.78 3
5 digits 135 1.10 2 84 3.56 3
6 digits 40 1.03 2 11 3.27 2
7 digits 30 1.43 2 23 1.65 1
8 or more digits 37 1.68 3 15 1.40 1
Totals 565 (53% of positive $WTA) 505 (37% of positive $WTA)
a Mini-disapproval was – #1 + #2 – #11; range –9 for least disapproval to +3 for most disapproval.
b A 1–10 scale was used for Rated WTA, with 1 = Never and 10 = Definitely willing to accept.
compared with a mini-disapproval score excluding the
items concerned with WTA:
Mini-Disapproval = −#1 (agree)
+#2 (do not approve)
−#11 (positive feelings)
As shown in Table 6, this mini-disapproval measure
is systematically related to the size of the WTA responses
(the correlation between log WTA and this score for WTA
≥ $1,000 is .30; p < .0001).
Reasons. We measured participants’ reasons for disap-
proval, with an expectation that the reasons would capture
both cognitive and affective reasons for disapproving of
the scenario.
The means of the ratings (1 = Disagree; 5 = Agree)
for the 16 reasons across the 22 scenarios ranged from
1.26 (Religious on NLifeIns) to 4.44 (Future on Ban-
Drugs and Future and Moral on CarCost). Two of the
reasons scales best discriminated among the scenarios:
Anger (the means ranged from 1.49 for NHighway to
3.95 for CarCost) and Disgust (from 1.62 for NHighway
to 4.20 for CarCost). There were five reasons scales that
the participants did not agree with for any scenario (i.e.,
the largest mean across the scenarios was less than 3.0,
the mid-point of the scale): Not Party To, Religious, Un-
comfortable, Phony, and Not Me.
2.3.5 Factor analysis
We conducted a factor analysis on the full matrix of rea-
sons ratings for each scenario. (In essence, this analysis
Figure 1: Plot of 22 scenario factor scores on 2 factors,
Experiment 1.
accounts for correlations among the reasons. Each corre-
lation used the available data from all subjects and scenar-
ios.) After first examining the data averaged by scenario
to see if there were any patterns, we averaged the factor
data by participant. This yielded, for each participant, a
mean factor score for each factor, which was then used to
predict mean scenario disapproval scores. This analysis
allowed us to test whether particular classes of reasons
best predicted taboo responses.
A principal components factor analysis using an or-
thogonal (Varimax) rotation revealed two factors with
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eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The analysis produced a
clean solution, accounting for 82.4% of the variance in
the items. Factor 1 included many of the reasons, with
Anger and Disgust leading the list, followed by Not Trust,
Send Message, and Uncomfortable: it is clearly an af-
fective factor. Factor 2 was primarily characterized by
the Conflict, Not Me, and Not Enuf Info scales; it is
apparently a cognitive factor. One reason scale, Phony,
loaded on both factors; it loaded most heavily on Factor
2. Nine of the 11 reasons loading on Factor 1 and four of
the five reasons loading on Factor 2 have loadings of .80
or greater, showing high intercorrelations of these items
with the factor.
Affective and cognitive factors by scenario. Figure 1
shows the 22 scenarios in the factor space. Note the U-
shape in the figure: Scenarios that are judged to be high-
est in affect tend also to be judged easiest to think about.
Scenarios that are judged difficult to think about are in-
termediate in affect. Scenarios that are judged lowest in
affect are also judged easy to think about.
Regressing disapproval on the cognitive and affective
factors. From the factor analysis, factor scores can be
computed for each individual and each scenario, based on
the responses given to the reason items. Averaging these
factor scores across the scenarios yields, for each indi-
vidual, mean factor scores. Likewise, each participant
can be characterized with a mean Disapproval, the mean
across scenarios. We regressed the mean factor scores on
the mean Disapproval scores, across individuals, to test
whether Disapproval was related to Affect, Cognition, or
both. As Table 7 shows, both Affect and Cognition were
related to Disapproval, in opposite directions: more Af-
fect led to more disapproval, but more Cognition led to
less disapproval.
There was also, for both Reasons sets, a significant in-
teration, as shown in Figure 2. This figure shows that
when Affect is low, Cognition has little or no effect on
Disapproval. But for those individuals who showed both
high Affect and low (easy to think about) Cognition, Dis-
approval was especially high — higher than would be
predicted from the main effects of Affect and Cognition.
This interaction can be interpreted in two ways. One
possibility is that Cognition exerts a moderating influence
on Disapproval; that is, if participants think hard about a
strong-affect scenario, they will find it less awful.
The other possibility is that when a scenario strikes a
participant as being really bad, it therefore seems quite
simple; no need to delve into the details because the pro-
posal is just wrong. We will call this the bad-easy hypoth-
esis. This second interpretation draws some support from
the relationship between disapproval and cognition across
the 22 scenarios, as shown in Figure 3. The best and worst
Figure 2: Slopes showing the interaction between Affect
and Cognition, Experiment 1.
Figure 3: Disapproval versus cognition factor scores
across the 22 scenarios, Experiment 1.
scenarios are the easiest to think about. For the 13 sce-
narios with Disapproval scores above the mean, the cor-
relation between Disapproval and Cognition is −.80; for
the 9 low-Disapproval scenarios this correlation is +.82.
3 Experiment 2
We had three goals for Experiment 2: (1) Replicate the
interaction between Affect and Cognition found in Ex-
periment 1. (2) Test whether we can manipulate the mod-
erating influence of cognition, and (3) Remedy a defect
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Table 7: Regression results: slopes of the significant effects in experiment 1
Significant unstandardized regression coefficients
Reason Set Affective Factor Cognitive Factor Interaction R2
I 5.27**** –1.45**** –1.42** 0.62
II 3.96**** –1.56** –2.23**** 0.45
**p<.01, ****p<.0001
in Experiment 1 by requiring all participants to give a
dollar-based WTA response, thus allowing a more thor-
ough examination of WTA responses.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Participants in this study were 719 students at the Uni-
versity of Texas, recruited either as part of a course re-
quirement or as volunteers paid $5 for their participation
in this and other experiments. The pattern of responses
did not differ between the unpaid and paid participants.
3.1.2 Design
Scenarios. Experiment 2 used three of the scenarios
from Experiment 1 (slightly rewritten). Table 8 presents
the scenarios. The scenarios were presented either fol-
lowing order or the reverse: Highway, Animal (based on
Puppies of Experiment 1), and Terrorism (based on Mili-
tary in Experiment 1).
Cognitive manipulations. Experiment 2 had two cog-
nitive manipulations, presented in a complete 2x2 facto-
rial design. In the Memory Load manipulation, partici-
pants were asked at the beginning of the task to memo-
rize a seven-digit number; later, they were asked to recall
the number. This is a standard manipulation for cogni-
tive load (e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). In the Scram-
bled manipulation, the sentences of the scenario were
presented in scrambled order, which made the scenario
difficult, but not impossible, to understand. The Scram-
bled version of Terrorism is shown at the bottom of Table
9. This manipulation has also been used in previous re-
search (Sweller, 1994) to increase cognitive load.
Scales. Immediately following the presentation of the
first scenario, participants rated their WTA: “Would you
be willing to accept a reduction in taxes (i.e., a rebate
check) for this proposal?” on a scale with 1 labeled Never
and 10 labeled Definitely. We will term this measure
“Rated WTA.” Next the participants specified a dollar
amount: “My savings would have to be at least $______
per year to approve of this proposal (please put the small-
est amount).”3 We term this measure “$WTA.”
After all three scenarios, the Memory Load partici-
pants recalled the seven-digit number. Following that,
participants rated all three scenarios on the following six
reasons, using scales from 1 to 9 with 1 labeled “Not
very” and 9 labeled “Very” (key words in the text, ital-
icized to denote the names of the scales, were not itali-
cized for participants):
How complex was the highway [animal, terror-
ism] scenario?
To what extent did the highway [animal, terror-
ism] scenario involve morality?
How difficult was the highway [animal, terror-
ism] scenario to understand?
How disgusting was the highway [animal, ter-
rorism] scenario?
How phony was the highway [animal, terror-
ism] scenario?
How angry did the highway [animal, terrorism]
scenario make you?
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Disapproval
As expected, the three scenarios were not highly regarded
by participants. The mean Rated WTA was 4.68 for High-
way, 5.10 for Animal, and 4.00 for Terrorism, all below
the midpoint (5.50) of the scale. The means (antilog of
mean log, excluding blanks and zeros) of $WTA were
$534, $273, and $572, respectively. The correlations be-
tween Rated WTA and log $WTA (excluding blanks and
zeroes) were significant: Highway −.42, Animal −.48,
and Terrorism −.44.
3Due to an error in preparing the stimuli, 321 participants were not
given the dollar-based WTA query for the Animals scenario only.
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Table 8: Scenarios Used in Experiment 2.
Highway Safety: As part of their budget preparations for the coming year, the state Department of Transportation
(located at 1275 Oak Street) has decided not to add an extra lane to a dangerous section of a three-lane highway. This
decision will lower their budget request. Although they acknowledge that there have been more deaths than expected
in recent years along this stretch of highway, their analysis (conducted by Robert Jones) shows that comparing the cost
of improvements with the number of excess deaths implies that each life saved is worth $20 million. They consider
this amount too expensive.
Because of this decision not to improve the dangerous section of highway, the legislature will lower the Department
of Transportation’s annual budget to reflect the savings. This will lower your taxes and result in a rebate check sent to
all citizens. What is the SMALLEST yearly tax savings that you would require to approve this decision? NOTE: Even
if you do not pay taxes currently, assume that you would receive a check for the amount that you put. Would you be
willing to accept a reduction in taxes (a rebate check) for this proposal?
Animal Shelters: There are many organizations throughout the state charged with taking care of stray and aban-
doned animals. For instance, there are animal pounds and shelters such as Town Lake Animal Shelter. These organi-
zations receive many more puppies and kittens than they can place in adoption. In order to deal with this problem, the
State Legislature is now considering a proposal to sell a proportion of unwanted puppies and kittens to experimental
labs for research into causes of blindness.
This proposal to sell puppies and kittens to labs will reduce the cost of running the pounds and thus will reduce your
taxes. Assume you pay taxes each year. Would you be willing to accept a reduction in your taxes from the proposal
passing?
Terrorism Currently, there are 653,284 active and reserve military personnel in the United States Armed Forces. The
United States Congress (the Senate and House of Representatives) is considering a plan to allow military personnel
or their families to pay large sums of money to buy their way out of being sent to another country to fight against
terrorism. Under this plan, military personnel would be guaranteed, once the payment is made, that they would not be
sent into combat. Someone else would go instead. This plan would raise large sums of money for the government and
the defense system and also would lower taxes.
This plan would raise money for the government and thus reduce your taxes. Would you be willing to accept a
reduction in taxes (i.e., in the form of a rebate check) for this proposal?
Terrorism [Scrambled] The United States Congress currently is considering a plan. The Congress consists of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Someone else would go to another country to fight against terrorism, with
this plan. Military personnel would be guaranteed, once the payment is made, that they would not be sent into combat.
By paying large sums of money, military personnel or their families would buy their way out of going. Currently, there
are 653,284 active and reserve military personnel in the United States Armed Forces. This plan would raise large sums
of money for the government and the defense system and also would lower taxes.
Note. Highway Safety and Animal Shelters also had scrambled versions, not shown here.
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Table 9: Frequencies and percentages for WTA re-
sponses, Experiment 2
Totals Subtotals
f % f %
Blank 413* 23
Zero 40 2
Positive WTA 1383 75
WTA w/in range 1079 59
WTA too high 304* 16
Total 1836
* Protest = 1 717 39
As shown in Table 6, the use of very large WTA re-
sponses was systematically related to Rated WTA, repli-
cating the results of Experiment 1 with a different com-
parison measure.
We constructed a Protest measure using the $WTA
data. Protest was defined as equal to 1 if $WTA was
blank or greater than $1,500 for Highway and Animals
or $2,500 for Terrorism; Protest was equal to 0 if $WTA
was in the acceptable range. Using other cutoffs for unac-
ceptably large $WTA’s gave essentially the same results;
these cutoffs are consistent with Experiment 1. Table 9
shows the distribution of responses to the $WTA item;
39% of all responses were protests. Both the $WTA re-
sponses that were blank and those that were larger than
the cutoffs were associated with Rated WTA scores that
were significantly (p < .0001) lower (i.e., more disapprov-
ing) than the Rated WTA scores for participants who gave
positive $WTA responses within the prescribed limits, for
each of the three scenarios. However, the few (40) zero
$WTA responses were not systematically related to Rated
WTA; they were excluded from the protest measure and
treated as missing data.
3.2.2 Reasons
The varimax rotation factor analysis revealed the same
two factors: Complex and Difficult loaded strongly on
one (the Cognitive factor) and Disgusting, Morality, and
Angry on the other (the Affective factor). Both factors
had eigenvalues above 1. Phony was not correlated with
the other reasons scales; it will not be discussed further.
The factor loadings were high and the factors well distin-
guished; as measures of the two factors we therefore took
the mean of the ratings across the relevant reasons scales.
Table 10: Mean (antilog of mean log) dollar willing-
ness to accept for memory load versus no load (excluding
blanks and zeroes) in Experiment 2
Highway Animal Terrorism
Memory load $396 $210 $448
No memory load $647 $365 $705
p < .05 p < .05 p < .09
3.2.3 Cognitive manipulations
Scrambling the scenarios had almost no effect on any
measure. Even the effect that seems most likely, an in-
crease in the Cognitive measure (showing that the sce-
nario was rated more difficult/complex when scrambled),
was significant only for the Terrorism scenario (without
correction for multiple tests). There was no effect of
Scrambling on the Disapproval measures.
Requiring participants to remember a seven-digit num-
ber (Memory Load) also had essentially no effects; a
significant increase in the Cognitive measure was found
only for the Highway scenario. Memory Load did affect
$WTA, however; as shown in Table 10, participants un-
der Memory Load gave lower dollar amounts for all three
scenarios, although this result was only marginally sig-
nificant (p <.09) for Terrorism. (All significance tests are
uncorrected.)
There were no interaction effects for Scrambling and
Memory Load; even a double dose of cognitive stress did
not affect the Disapproval measures or the Cognitive and
Affective scores.
In a third, otherwise unreported, experiment, we tried
to influences participants to focus on either their cogni-
tions or their affect. A total of 274 paid participants (in
Eugene, OR, recruited and run as in Experiment 1) were
given six of the scenarios used in Experiment 1 (Puppies,
NCloneCell, DrugTest, Dolphins, CarCost, and LifeIns,
always in that order) with the same rating scales. Af-
ter reading the first paragraph of each scenario, but be-
fore making any ratings, half the participants were told
“Please reread this scenario while thinking hard about it.
Try to consider all the different aspects presented in or
relevant to the scenario. Then, on the lines below, make a
list of these various considerations.” The other half of the
participants were told, “Please reread this scenario and let
your feelings flow. What are your emotional reactions to
this scenario? Take a moment to listen to your feelings.
Then, on the lines below, make a list of these various feel-
ings.” Nine blank lines followed these instructions. The
next page repeated the scenario at the top and followed
with the same scales, in the same format, as Experiment
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1. These manipulations were entirely unsuccessful; only
a small, uninterpretable scattering of significant effects
was found. Many of the “think hard” participants, as well
as the “feelings flow” participants, listed emotive (and,
sometimes, quite vulgar) considerations.
3.2.4 Regressing disapproval on the cognitive and
affective factors
As in the first experiment, we regressed average disap-
proval on average affective and cognitive factor. The re-
sults were similar to the results from the first experiment.
Because there were only three scenarios in this experi-
ment, we present results by scenario.
Table 11 shows the significant slopes from the regres-
sions of the Disapproval measures onto the Affect and
Cognition scores for each scenario across participants.
The main effect of Affect is that disapproval was higher
for participants who rated the scenario more highly on
the affective reasons. The main effect of Cognition, sig-
nificant for some but not all of the analyses, shows the
reverse effect: The higher the cognitive ratings, the lower
the Disapproval measures. The interaction between Af-
fect and Cognition found in Experiment 1 was replicated
here in 7 of the 9 tests. Figure 4 illustrates three of these
interactions (the others were similar). Again, the great-
est Disapproval comes from those who give high Affect
ratings and low (easy to think about) Cognitive ratings.
4 General discussion
The three goals of these studies were (1) to discriminate
mere disapproval from protest responses and true taboo,
(2) to explore the reasons people give for rejecting sce-
narios, and (3) to study the relationship between reasons
and rejection.
As for the first goal, the set of scenarios drew a wide
range of responses on all measures and strong agree-
ment as to whether the scenarios were considered good
or bad. The scenarios intended to be neutral had the
lowest Disapproval scores, which was reassuring. How-
ever, our effort to discriminate among kinds of disap-
proval was unsuccessful; no matter how we worded the
question, our participants seemed to be telling us only
one thing: to what extent they disapproved of each sce-
nario. This result may be due to participants’ view that
WTA responses are not serious expressions of monetary
values but are, instead, expressions of attitude (Kahne-
man, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999); if so, one would expect
the high correlations we found between WTA and the rat-
ing scales.
The high rates of WTA refusals, the large number of
zero responses (in Experiment 1), and the high number
Figure 4: Slopes showing the interaction between Affect
and Cognition, Experiment 2.
of very large responses also echo previous results in sug-
gesting that WTA expresses an attitude, not a monetary
value (Kahneman et al., 1999). For example, consider
the Puppies/Animal scenario. The market for puppies
and kittens for use in experimental labs within a state is
quite limited, while the supply is vast. Surely, then, a per-
household savings of $1.00 is unrealistically high. But for
a PETA supporter to respond “75 cents” is to suggest an
unacceptable cold-heartedness. This is probably why the
Animal scenario (in Experiment 1I) had a mean $WTA of
$273. Additional support for the attitude view of WTA,
and the first such finding as far as we know, is shown in
Table 6: The larger the WTA, the greater the disapproval,
even among absurdly large amounts (e.g., $100,000 vs.
$1,000,000).
Our second and third goals, the analysis of reasons for
disapproval, yielded rich results. The finding of two clear
factors, affect and cognition, is as expected, both because
we used several scales for each of these concepts and be-
cause of the large literature showing the influence of both
these factors on decision making (for a summary, see
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Table 11: Regression results: slopes of the significant effects in Experiment 2.
Highway Animal Terrorism
Rated WTA $WTA Protest Rated WTA $WTA Protest Rated WTA $WTA Protest
Affect –.66 .43 .08 –.95 .58 .08 –.83 .44 .09
Cognition .23 –.02 .29 –.26 –.07
A x C .09 –.07 –.01 .14 –.02 –.09 –.01
R2 .30 .12 .14 .49 .21 .17 .39 .15 .23
Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). With these highly objec-
tionable scenarios, affect was predominant, accounting
for almost all the variance (R2 = .97) in the disapproval
scores across the scenarios. But cognition was also re-
lated to disapproval, curvilinearly across scenarios; both
the best and the worst scenarios were deemed easiest to
think about.
In analyzing individual differences, we found that dis-
approval was again strongly positively related to affect.
In addition, we found that disapproval was negatively re-
lated to cognition (i.e., people who tended to rate the sce-
narios as easier to thing about were more disapproving)
and that there was an interaction between cognition and
affect in predicting disapproval: When affect was low,
cognition was not related to disapproval, but when af-
fect was high, disapproval was especially strong for those
people who rated the scenarios as cognitively easy.
One possible interpretation of this interaction is that
cognition serves as a moderating influence: If you have to
think hard about a scenario, it therefore doesn’t seem so
bad. We tested this interpretation by increasing cognitive
load in two different ways and by requiring participants
to “think hard” versus “feel hard.” These efforts yielded
only meager results. We thus favor the other interpreta-
tion of the interaction: Very bad scenarios are rated as
easy to think about because it is not necessary to consider
the details to know that they are wrong.
This bad-easy interpretation also explains the curvilin-
ear relationship between disapproval and cognition across
scenarios. Other research has shown that affective re-
sponses tend to be faster than cognitive responses (Peters,
2006). Thus, when scenarios are quickly recognized as
extremely bad or good, disapproval/approval is recorded
without much thought and these scenarios are rated as
easy to understand. Deep reflection (or as one participant
called it, “rocket scientist thinking”) simply isn’t needed
when one’s basic norms are violated.
On the other hand, our results are also not inconsistent
with the possibility that cognitive difficulty helps disrupt
the strong link between affect and disapproval. This pos-
sibility is intriguing because it is similar to recent work
showing that cognitive load can decrease propensity to-
ward decision biases (Drolet & Luce, 2004). Just as load
seems to disrupt whatever processes lead them toward
biased decisions, cognitive engagement may disrupt the
strong influence affect can have on decision making. Our
work suggests that the interplay between emotion and
reasoning in moral judgment is complex, a finding sup-
ported by fMRI work (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom,
Darley, & Cohen, 2001).
The word “taboo” was never presented to our partici-
pants nor did we use it in presenting the design and re-
sults of our experiments. Nevertheless, we believe that
this paper does address the nature of taboo values, in part
because the scenarios we used are similar to those used
in previous taboo research (although, unlike some ear-
lier studies, we chose only those scenarios that also had
some sort of benefit). On the basis of our results, we ten-
tatively suggest that taboo situations have two essential,
perhaps defining, characteristics: They evoke strong neg-
ative affect (like anger or disgust) and they are easy to
judge without much thought. The scenarios that are hard
to think about are those that evoke only a moderate af-
fective response. Given that we tried hard to write quite
ghastly stories, we were surprised at the high number of
scenarios that fell into this “difficult but not taboo” cate-
gory.
This interpretation of our findings has implications for
the definition and understanding of taboo values. Re-
search by Baron and Leshner (2000), for example, has
concluded that what they term protected values appear to
be more “labile and amenable to challenge” (p. 183) than
previously thought (e.g., see Baron & Spranca, 1997).
One example they present (page 184) is that unreflec-
tive overgeneralizations (e.g., people who say they would
never trade off life for money) should yield to simple
challenges such as specific counter examples (e.g., do
these same people approve of an increase in the health
care budget large enough to screen everyone for colon
cancer?). Our results suggest a different interpretation.
Endorsements of general statements are just that: broad
expressions of moral or ethical belief, lacking predictive
ability for specific decisions. Response refusals that ap-
pear in the context of more specific choices, such as the
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 2007 Taboo values 184
counterexamples introduced by Baron and Leshner or the
scenarios used in our study, will be of two types: some
that evoke only moderately negative affect and thus are
difficult for people but not taboo, and others that evoke
strongly negative affect and are taboo. Our results sug-
gest that this latter set of choices will be unresponsive
to change or challenges. Indeed, in the seven experi-
ments reported by Baron and Lesher, although a signif-
icant number of participants yielded their protected val-
ues, there was always a hard core (often a majority) of
protected-value responses that continued to be protected
after the experimental manipulation. For example, with a
set of scenarios about genetically modified wheat, 61.8%
of the respondents who were characterized as having
strict protected values for a particular scenario refused to
accept that scenario even when the probability of harm
was lowered to 1/10,000,000 and the probability of ben-
efit was increased to 1.00. Our findings suggest that dif-
ferences in affect might explain why some people yield
their apparently protected values and others do not.
Our findings also have implications, more generally,
for the elicitation of preferences in complex or contro-
versial policy settings that involve choices across objec-
tionable alternatives (Calabresi, 1968; Fischhoff, 1991).
Much has been written (including papers we have writ-
ten) about the benefits of structuring values or encour-
aging people to think carefully about their concerns in
the light of personal actions or societal policy options
that require tradeoffs across multiple benefits and costs
and risks. In recent years, this desire to help people
think about a difficult topic has been joined by a recog-
nition that it is also important to acknowledge affective
responses, with affect seen as conditioning and at times
guiding cognitive responses (Peters, 2006). Here our re-
sults are mixed. Many of the scenarios judged to be bad
were also hard to think about, and for these it is expected
that help with the decision would be welcomed. For taboo
scenarios, however, our results suggest that it will be diffi-
cult to get people to accept assistance in carefully consid-
ering or thinking through tough decisions. For example,
it does not matter how much a white person can save in
life insurance premiums if blacks are charged more than
whites. If it’s bad enough to be taboo, then it’s easy to
know what to do, and help with thinking carefully is not
likely to be accepted when a proposal is so clearly wrong.
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Appendix: Experiment 1 scenarios
BanDrugs A major pharmaceutical company has pro-
posed to sell to less-developed nations drugs that are
banned in all industrialized countries. This proposal, if
adopted, would increase the company’s profits.
Assume that you hold shares of stock now worth
$5,000, in this pharmaceutical company. The proposal,
if approved, has the potential to make you money by
increasing the profits of the company through increased
pharmaceutical sales in less developed countries. What
is the SMALLEST yearly increase in the value of your
stock shares (above and beyond increases if the company
did not sell banned drugs) that you would require to ap-
prove of this proposal? My stock shares would have to
increase in value by at least $_______ per year to approve
of this proposal. [B 9/6, $5000]
CarCost: A major automobile company decides not to
recall all their 1999 compact-model cars, which have a
known defect, because they have done an internal analy-
sis showing that the cost of repair is very high in relation
to the small number of lives that would be saved. By not
spending the money on a recall, the company can lower
the prices of their new cars.
Assume that you are about to buy a new car. You have
decided on one of two cars that seem identical to you.
One of the cars (call it Car A) is made by the company
described above, although it is NOT the model of car that
suffers from the defect. The other car (Car B) is made
by some other major automobile company. Car B costs
$25,000. Car A is cheaper. What is the SMALLEST
savings that you would require in order for you to buy
Car A rather than Car B? My savings would have to be at
least $_______ for me to buy Car A. [B 6/9, $12,500]
CarSuits: A major automobile company decides not to
recall all their 1999 compact-model cars, which have a
known defect, because they have done an internal analy-
sis showing that the amount of money the company would
have to pay out to settle lawsuits arising from injuries and
deaths resulting from the defect is less than the amount of
money needed to recall and fix the defect. By not spend-
ing the money on a recall, the company can lower the
prices of their new cars.
Assume that you are about to buy a new car. You have
decided on one of two cars that seem identical to you.
One of the cars (call it Car A) is made by the company
described above, although it is NOT the model of car that
suffers from the defect. The other car (Car B) is made
by some other major automobile company. Car B costs
$25,000. Car A is cheaper. What is the SMALLEST
savings that you would require in order for you to buy
Car A rather than Car B? My savings would have to be at
least $_______ for me to buy Car A. [A 6/11, $12,500]
CloneCell: A genetics company is planning to clone
human cells in a petri dish for two weeks so that new tis-
sue sources can be produced to aid the recovery of serious
burn patients.
This plan will reduce the cost of treating burn patients
because it will help them to recover faster. Thus it will
decrease the annual cost of health insurance. Also, it will
lower taxes because tax money pays the costs for many
severely burned patients. What is the SMALLEST de-
crease in your yearly taxes and medical insurance that
you would require to approve of this plan? My tax and
insurance savings would have to be at least $_______ per
year to approve of this plan. [B 7/8, $5,000]
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NCloneCell: A genetics company is planning to grow
artificial skin in a petri dish for two weeks so that new tis-
sue sources can be produced to aid the recovery of serious
burn patients.
This plan will reduce the cost of treating burn patients
because it will help them to recover faster. Thus it will
decrease the annual cost of health insurance. Also, it will
lower taxes because tax money pays the costs for many
severely burned patients. What is the SMALLEST de-
crease in your yearly taxes and medical insurance that
you would require to approve of this plan? My tax and
insurance savings would have to be at least $_______ per
year to approve of this plan. [A 2/5, $5,000]
Coma: Many people now die because of a severe short-
age of organs (heart, lungs, etc.) available for transplant-
ing. A local hospital has proposed a plan to harvest or-
gans for transplants from patients in deep coma. Harvest
decisions would be made by a team of two doctors and an
ethicist.
Assume that you need to go to a hospital for a rou-
tine operation using only local anesthetics. Your medical
insurance will pay only a portion of the total costs, and
you expect that your out-of-pocket expenditures will be
about $500. You have the choice of going to the hos-
pital that is proposing to harvest organs (call it Hospital
A) or to another one that is not (call it Hospital B). Oth-
erwise, the hospitals are the same, and you would have
the same surgeon. Hospital A is cheaper because of its
organ-harvesting program. What is the SMALLEST sav-
ings in the cost of your operation such that you would go
to Hospital A? The operation at Hospital A would have to
be at least $_______ cheaper for me to go there. [A 11/9,
$450]
Dolphins: Commercial fishers have proposed using a
new fishing technique that would reduce the cost of catch-
ing fish but would also increase the number of dolphin
deaths due to fishing. It is estimated that adoption of this
technique would reduce the price of fish and provide for
more employment among fishers, but the number of dol-
phin deaths each year would increase by about 35%.
Assume that you and your family eat fish often and
spend about $1,000 per year on fish. If the new fishing
technique is adopted, you would save money on the cost
of fish. What is the SMALLEST yearly savings that you
would require to approve of this proposal? My savings
would have to be at least $_______ per year to approve
of this proposal. [A 3/8, $500]
DrugTest: One-half of the patients in Hospital A with
an otherwise fatal type of cancer are given a new drug
that potentially could help them whereas the other half are
given a placebo (non-active pill). Although early results
indicate that the new drug is saving lives, the Hospital has
decided to continue giving a placebo to half the patients
for as long as originally planned, in order to fully test the
new drug and help scientists understand its benefits and
risks.
Assume that you need to go to a hospital for a routine
operation – cancer is not involved. Your medical insur-
ance will not pay the total cost, so there will be out-of-
pocket costs to you of about $1000. You have the choice
of going to Hospital A, which is doing the drug test, or
to Hospital B, which does not do such tests. Otherwise,
the hospitals are the same, and you would have the same
surgeon. Hospital A is cheaper. What is the SMALLEST
savings for your stay in the hospital such that you would
go to Hospital A? Hospital A would have to be at least
$_______ cheaper for me to go there. [B 11/1, $950]
NDrugTest: Hospital A is proposing that half its pa-
tients with otherwise fatal cancers be given a new drug
that potentially could help them and the other half be
given a different new promising drug. No patient would
be given both drugs, so as to help scientists understand
the benefits and risks from the drugs.
Assume that you need to go to a hospital for a routine
operation – cancer is not involved. Your medical insur-
ance will not pay the total cost, so there will be out-of-
pocket costs to you of about $1000. You have the choice
of going to Hospital A, which is proposing the drug test,
or to Hospital B, which never does such tests. Otherwise,
the hospitals are the same, and you would have the same
surgeon. Hospital A is cheaper. What is the SMALLEST
savings for your stay in the hospital such that you would
go to Hospital A? Hospital A would have to be at least
$_______ cheaper for me to go there. [A 5/2, $950]
GenMod: A world-wide food conglomerate has de-
cided to sell genetically modified wheat to countries in
Africa. This wheat, which incorporates selected genetic
material from pigs, has higher yields and also contains
higher levels of Vitamins A and D than conventional
wheat, and thus will reduce malnutrition in Africa.
This food conglomerate (call it Company A) sells a
wide variety of canned, frozen, and packaged foods in
your grocery store, as does another food conglomerate
(call it Company B). You judge that the products sold
by Company A and Company B are equal in quality, but
Company A’s products are cheaper. Assume that you do
the grocery shopping for a family of four people and that
you spend about $3,000 yearly on the products sold by
these companies. What is the SMALLEST yearly savings
in your food costs that you would require to buy Com-
pany A’s products instead of Company B’s products? My
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savings would have to be at least $_______ per year to
buy Company A’s products. [A 9/3, $1,500]
GenRsch: A world-wide food conglomerate has made
a proposal to the National Science Foundation for funds
to do basic and applied research on the genetic modifica-
tion of wheat. The company anticipates that the research
will lead to a more drought-resistant strain of wheat.
This food conglomerate (call it Company A) sells a
wide variety of canned, frozen, and packaged foods in
your grocery store, as does another food conglomerate
(call it Company B). You judge that the products sold
by Company A and Company B are equal in quality, but
Company A’s products are cheaper. Assume that you do
the grocery shopping for a family of four people and that
you spend about $3,000 yearly on the products sold by
these companies. What is the SMALLEST yearly savings
in your food costs that you would require to buy Com-
pany A’s products instead of Company B’s products? My
savings would have to be at least $_______ per year to
buy Company A’s products. [B 8/3, $1,500]
Highway: As part of their budget preparations for the
coming year, the state Department of Transportation has
decided not to add an extra lane to a dangerous section of
a three-lane highway. This decision will lower their bud-
get request. Although they acknowledge that there have
been more deaths than expected in recent years along
this stretch of highway, their analysis shows that compar-
ing the cost of improvements with the number of excess
deaths implies that each life saved is worth $20 million,
which they consider too expensive.
Because of this decision not to improve the dangerous
section of highway, the legislature will lower the Depart-
ment of Transportation’s annual budget to reflect the sav-
ings. This will lower your taxes. What is the SMALL-
EST yearly tax savings that you would require to approve
of this decision? My savings would have to be at least
$_______ per year to approve of this decision. [A 4/10,
$1,500]
NHighway: As part of their budget preparations for
the coming year, the state Department of Transportation
has decided not to add an extra lane to a section of a three-
lane highway because there have been no deaths or seri-
ous accidents on that stretch. This decision will lower
their budget request.
Because of this decision not to improve the highway,
the legislature will lower the Department of Transporta-
tion’s annual budget to reflect the savings. This will lower
your taxes. What is the SMALLEST yearly tax savings
that you would require to approve of this decision? My
savings would have to be at least $_______ per year to
approve of this decision. [B 5/2, $1,500]
LifeIns: Company A, a major life insurance company,
has decided to establish two sets of rates for life insur-
ance, one set for whites and another, more expensive set
for blacks. They argue that this is fair because whites, on
average, live longer than blacks.
Assume that you are white and that you need to buy
a $200,000 life insurance policy to protect your family.
You can buy it from Company A, with different rates for
whites and blacks, or from Company B, which has the
same rates for whites and blacks. Because of their two
sets of rates, Company A is cheaper for you. What is
the SMALLEST savings in the annual premium that you
would require to buy your life insurance from Company
A? My savings would have to be at least $_______ per
year to buy from Company A. [A 7/4, $2,000]
NLifeIns: Company A, a major life insurance com-
pany, has decided to establish two sets of rates for life
insurance, one set for non-smokers and another, more ex-
pensive set for smokers. They argue that this is fair be-
cause non-smokers, on average, live longer than smokers.
Assume that you are a non-smoker and that you need
to buy a $200,000 life insurance policy to protect your
family. You can buy it from Company A, with different
rates for smokers and non-smokers, or from Company B,
which has the same rates for smokers and non-smokers.
Because of their two sets of rates, Company A is cheaper
for you. What is the SMALLEST savings in the annual
premium that you would require to buy your life insur-
ance from Company A? My savings would have to be at
least $_______ per year to buy from Company A. [B 2/5,
$2,000]
Military: Congress is considering a plan to allow mil-
itary personnel or their families to pay large sums of
money to buy their way out of being sent to another
country to fight against terrorism. Under this plan, mili-
tary personnel would be guaranteed, once the payment is
made, that they would not be sent into combat. Someone
else would go instead. This plan would raise money for
the government and thus lower taxes. This plan would
raise money for the government and thus reduce your
taxes. What is the SMALLEST reduction in your yearly
taxes that you would require to approve of this plan? My
tax savings would have to be at least $_______ per year
to approve of this plan. [B 10/4, $2,500]
MSLog: The government is considering a plan to per-
mit logging of old-growth trees on one portion of a Na-
tional Park in order to harvest microscopic organisms that
grow in their roots, because these organisms might lead
to new pharmaceutical products that would help to fight
MS (multiple sclerosis).
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This plan will require that the logging company pay
the Park Service for the timber it logs. If new drugs are
successfully developed using the root organisms, then ad-
ditional payments will be made to the Park Service by
the pharmaceutical firms. These payments would lower
your taxes. In addition, successful treatment of MS would
lower your medical insurance costs. What is the SMALL-
EST savings in taxes and insurance each year that you
would require to approve of this plan? My savings would
have to be at least $_______ each year to approve of this
plan. [A 8/1, $5,000]
Pollute: Your local utility company has applied for per-
mission from federal regulators to reduce expenditures
on pollution controls. This proposal, if approved, would
save money for ratepayers but increase the incidence of
deaths from childhood asthma.
What is the SMALLEST reduction in your yearly cost
for electricity that you would require to approve of this
proposal to reduce expenditures on pollution controls?
My savings would have to be at least $_______ per year
to approve of this proposal. [A 1/6, $1,200]
Puppies: Animal pounds and animal shelters across the
state receive more puppies and kittens than they can place
in adoption. The State Legislature is now considering a
proposal to sell all unwanted puppies and kittens to ex-
perimental labs for research into causes of blindness.
This proposal to sell puppies and kittens to labs will re-
duce the cost of running the pounds and thus will reduce
your taxes. What is the smallest reduction in your taxes
each year that you would require to approve of this pro-
posal? My tax savings would have to be at least $_______
per year to approve of this proposal. [A 10/7, $1,500]
RadioNuc: Congress is proposing a law to allow higher
amounts of radionuclide emissions from coal-fired power
plants because a careful analysis shows that the current
limits imply a value of $10 million for each life saved.
Leaders of Congress consider this to be an unreasonably
high value. The new limit would lead to lower electrical
bills and make brownouts less likely.
This proposal, if approved, would decrease the cost of
electricity. Assuming that all cost savings are passed on
to ratepayers in the form of lower electricity bills, what is
the SMALLEST yearly reduction in your electricity bills
that you would require to approve of this proposal? My
savings would have to be at least $_______ per year to
approve of this proposal. [B 3/11, $1,200]
TreeTrade: A large timber company has proposed ex-
changing a parcel of forested lands with the US Forest
Service. The company would give to the Forest Service
a tract of second-growth forest that is close to a major
east-coast population center and will be a good recreation
area. In return, the timber company would receive a tract
of virgin forest in Montana. It would harvest the trees in
Montana and thus increase its profits.
Assume that you own stock, now worth $5,000, in the
timber company. If the proposed land exchange is ap-
proved, the company’s profits will increase and the value
of your stock will go up. What is the SMALLEST yearly
increase in your stock (above and beyond increases that
would occur if the land exchange does not happen) that
you would require to approve of this proposal? My stock
would have to increase in value by at least $_______ per
year for me to approve of this proposal. [B1/10, $5,000]
UnivMonk: State University A plans to breed monkeys
for use in its own experimental laboratories as part of
research into vaccines for HIV/AIDS. Some of the re-
searchers have complained that the allocated space is too
small so that the living conditions for the monkeys will
be horrific, but the University says it can’t afford more
space.
Imagine that you are about to go to college. You have
been accepted by University A, which plans to breed
monkeys for research, and also by University B, which
does not. Otherwise, the two universities are the same
for you. University A has lower tuition. What is the
SMALLEST savings in tuition that you would require in
order to attend University A? University A would have to
be at least $_______ cheaper per year. [B 4/7, $2,000]
